

Blacklisting Malicious Web Sites using a Secure Version of the DHT Protocol Kademlia


Road Map

1. General Idea
2. Application Design
3. Implementation
4. Testing

Motivation

1. General Idea

**Total Dollar Loss
linked to Internet Fraud
in the USA in 2004-2008**



Source:
*Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)
2008 Annual Report*

www.ic3.gov/media/2009/090331.aspx

- Rising Internet crime rates
- Less phishing, less virus-infected attachments
- More malicious Web sites → more *drive by*-downloads


Initial Situation / Problem Description

1. General Idea




Solution

1. General Idea




Blacklisting Service

1. General Idea




Related Work

1. General Idea




Microsoft SmartScreen (IE 8+)




Google Safe Browsing (FF 3+ / Safari 3.2+)

Client-Server vs. Peer-to-Peer

1. General Idea




- Problems in a client-server-based environment:
 - Limited scalability
 - Resource limitations (CPU time, RAM, bandwidth, ...)
 - Synchronization between servers
 - Data replication
 - Single point of failure/attack



- Peer-to-Peer (P2P):
 - Scalability *by design*
 - Resource flexibility
 - No single point of failure/attack, no replication, no synchronization

Distributed Hash Tables

1. General Idea



Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) ...


- are *structured* P2P networks
- define a logical position for each node and entry
- store content at specific positions in the network, redundantly
- are fault-tolerant and reliable

Example (Pseudo-Code):

```
nodes := locateResponsibleNodes("infected.com");  
  
foreach nodes as node do  
    node.store("infected.com", "infected");
```


DHT-based Blacklisting Service

1. General Idea



DHT-based Blacklisting Service

1. General Idea



 Access Restriction

 Encrypted Communication


Goals and Requirements

2. Application Design

- *Use the honeynet-provided data to create a URL blacklisting service*
 - Handle large amounts of users (concurrency)
 - Fast queries, low round-trip time (RTT)
 - Scalable, extendable, reliable
- *Create a secure and trustworthy DHT protocol, called Kademlia Secure (KadS)*
 - Restricted access
 - Communication encryption

Underlying DHT Protocol: Kademlia

2. Application Design



Example (XOR metric):

$id_1 := 10111\dots$

$id_2 := 10001\dots$


$$\begin{aligned}d(id_1, id_2) &= id_1 \oplus id_2 \\ &= 00110\dots\end{aligned}$$

- Fault-tolerant design, provable consistency, good performance
- Assigns a 160-bit ID to
 - each node (*nodeID*)
 - each DHT entry (*key*)
- Distance is based on the XOR metric
- Provides four RPCs:
 - PING(*nodeID*)
 - STORE(*key*, *value*)
 - FIND_NODE(*nodeID* or *key*)
 - FIND_VALUE(*key*)

Kademlia Secure (KadS):

- One *root CA* certificate per network
- Each node must possess
 - a copy of the network's CA
 - a CA-signed public key certificate
 - a matching private key

→ *Provable Node Identity*



Protocol Extensions:

- KadS handshake (TCP)
 - Exchange public key certificates
 - Verify each other's identity
 - Exchange a random session key
- Encrypted Messaging (UDP)
 - Exchange messages using the previously negotiated session key

Using the KadS Network to create the Blacklisting Service

2. Application Design

Blacklist Data Structure:

- Domain
- Expiry Date
- Analysis Code
 - UNKNOWN
 - FAILED
 - CLEAN
 - PARTIALLY_INFECTED
 - INFECTED
- Path List

Example:


- Domain: infected.com
- Expiry Date: 01/01/2010
- Analysis Code:
PARTIALLY_INFECTED
- Path List:
</bad.html, /worse.html>

Blacklisting Service:

- KadS node (as distributed data storage)
- Client interfaces
 - for the honeyclients
 - for the browser plug-ins
- Business rules to enforce a specific data structure

Schematic Design of a Blacklist Node

2. Application Design



Interface DistributedHashMap

3. Implementation

```
public interface DistributedHashMap {  
    public void connect(InetSocketAddress address);  
    public boolean contains(Identifier key);  
    public Serializable get(Identifier key);  
    public void put(Identifier key, Serializable value);  
    public void remove(Identifier key);  
    public void close();  
}  
  
public class KadS implements DistributedHashMap {  
    ...  
}
```

Example: Using the KadS class

3. Implementation

```
Config config = new Config(new File("nodes/499/config.cfg"));
KadS kads = new KadS(config);

/* Connect to existing KadS network (KadS handshake, SK-Exchange) */
kads.connect(new InetSocketAddress("node1.kads.dyndns.org", 6852));

/* Add/Update a DHT entry */
kads.put("cities", new String[] { "Mannheim", "Heidelberg" });

/* Perform FIND_VALUE-Operation */
List<Country> countries =
    (List<Country>) kads.get("countries");

kads.close();
```

nodes/499/config.cfg


```
kads.ca = nodes/ca.cer
kads.node.cer = nodes/499/node.cer
kads.node.key = nodes/499/node.key

kads.port = 6852

kads.boot.sleep = 2000-10000
kads.boot.nodelist = nodes/bootstrap.list
kads.boot.tries = 5
```

Message Flow in a KadS Node

3. Implementation



Example: Using the `TrustworthyClient` class

3. Implementation

```
TrustworthyClient client =  
    new TrustworthyClient("Honey1.cer", "Honey1.key", "BlacklistCA.cer");  
  
/* Connect to a blacklist node in the network (SSL-Handshake) */  
client.connect(new InetSocketAddress("node1.blacklist.dyndns.org", 7001));  
  
if (!client.getAccessRights().hasWriteAccess())  
    throw new Exception("No write access!");  
  
/* Store a blacklist entry (via TCP/SSL socket) */  
client.store(new Entry("uni-mannheim.de", Entry.CLEAN));  
client.store(new Entry("uni-heidelberg.de", Entry.INFECTED));  
  
client.store(new Entry("spiegel.de", Entry.PARTIALLY_INFECTED,  
    Arrays.asList(new String[] {"/bad.html", "/infected.html"})));  
  
/* After all entries are stored, the TCP/SSL socket can be closed */  
client.disconnect();
```

Example: Using the `UntrustworthyClient` class

3. Implementation

```
/* Called once when the browser starts */
public void onBrowserStart() {
    blacklistClient = new UntrustworthyClient("BlacklistCA.cer");


    /* Connect to a blacklist node in the network */
    blacklistClient.connect(
        new InetSocketAddress("node1.blacklist.dyndns.org", 7001) );
}

/* Called every time code is loaded from a so far foreign page */
public void onBeforeOpenWebsite(String domain, String path, ...) {
    Entry entry = blacklistClient.query(domain);

    if (entry.getAnalysisCode() == Entry.INFECTED)
        throw new MaliciousWebsiteException(...);
    ...
}
```

Average RTT of KadS' put-Operation

4. Testing




- How fast is the KadS network?
- Is the speed dependent of the network size?

Static Load Test of a Single Blacklist Node

4. Testing


Static Load Test on a Blacklist Node

in a LAN of 45 nodes



Average RTT during the Load Test

in a LAN of 45 nodes



- How many requests can a single node handle?


Conclusion

- Trustworthy, secure DHT Protocol *KadS*
 - Prototypical implementation
 - Satisfactory results
 - No logarithmic scalability
 - Enables possibility of further research
- KadS-based Blacklisting Service
 - Not yet tested with real data

EOF


Query-Process of a Browser Client

3. Implementation



Kademlia's FIND_NODE-Operation

2. Application Design



The node 0011. . . tries to locate the identifier 1100. . .

Example: Behind the `put`-Operation

3. Implementation

```
/* Find K closest nodes */  
List<VerifiedNode> closestNodes = new FindNodeOperation(key, ..).execute();  
  
/* Send STORE requests to each of them */  
for (VerifiedNode recipientNode : closestNodes) {  
    StoreRequest storeRequest = new StoreRequest(key, value);  
    ...  
    messenger.addResponseListener(storeRequest.getId(), recipientNode, this);  
    messenger.send(recipientNode, storeRequest);  
}
```